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INTRODUCTION

Roe v. Wade's affirmation of a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion has not
secured women's access to this procedure. Rather, abortion opponents have enacted laws that,
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while avoiding an outright ban, have still impeded women's ability to exercise their right to an
abortion. One common method has been to use state legislatures' regulatory power over the
medical profession to compel physicians to impart an anti-abortion ideological message to
patients. This government interference with doctors' professional speech in the context of the
physician-patient relationship is disturbing not only because it infringes upon both physicians' and
patients' free speech rights, but because it does so with the aim and consequence of obstructing
the exercise of other constitutional rights.
In this article, I argue that physicians should not be reduced to mouthpieces for a state's
ideological preferences. In Part I, I start by discussing the growth of compelled physician speech
as a tool for disseminating a state's anti-abortion message, and place such provisions into three
categories: those requiring doctors 1) to state factually false or misleading assertions; 2) to present
an ideological statement as fact; and 3) to convey certain truthful information in an unbalanced
manner that impairs a physician's ability to impart an accurate, neutral assessment of a patient's
medical options. Next, in Part II, I provide justifications for First Amendment protections of
professional speech, especially in the medical context, and rebut arguments against protecting
doctors' free speech. Based on these justifications, in Part III I analyze the three categories of
problematic provisions and argue that they are unconstitutional. Finally, in Part IV, I discuss
courts' failure to protect physicians' professional speech against infringements by these laws. I
conclude by briefly discussing why, regardless of one's stance on abortion, this permissive
attitude toward compelled ideological speech has disturbing broader implications.
I. OVERVIEW OF LAWS COMPELLING ANTI-ABORTION IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH BY DOCTORS
A. Recent Trends in State-Level Anti-Abortion Legislation

State legislatures have been enacting anti-abortion legislation at unprecedented rates.
According to the Guttmacher Institute, states adopted 288 new abortion restrictions in the period
from 2011-2015, compared to 292 in the fifteen preceding years combined.2 396 restrictive
measures were considered in 46 states and 57 were of these were adopted in the 2015 legislative
session alone. 3

Although the most popular targets of abortion restrictions were medication abortions,
private insurance coverage, and minors' access,4 state legislatures also targeted physicians'
professional speech in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. Many such laws mandate
physicians impart the state's anti-abortion message to their patients,5 thereby raising First
Following Daniel Halberstam, Robert Post, and Claudia Haupt, I define "professional speech" as speech
"uttered in the course of professional practice" as distinct from "speech ... uttered by a professional." Daniel Halberstam,
CommercialSpeech, ProfessionalSpeech, and the ConstitutionalStatus of SocialInstitutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 843
(1999); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REv. 939, 947; Claudia E. Haupt, ProfessionalSpeech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1238 n.1 (2016).
2
Elizabeth Nash et. al, Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2015 State Policy
Review,
GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2015/statetrends42015.html
[https://perma
.cc/6JA9-ANDN].
1

3

Id

4

Id

5

See Parts I.B., C., and D, infra. Some state laws may raise other First Amendment or free speech issues,
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Amendment concerns about compelled speech. Generally speaking, these provisions can be
grouped into three categories: those requiring doctors 1) to state factually false or misleading
assertions; 2) to present an ideological statement as fact; and 3) to convey certain truthful
information in an unbalanced manner that impairs a physician's ability to impart an accurate,
neutral assessment of a patient's medical options.
B. FactuallyFalse or Misleading Assertions

Laws that fall within this category require physicians to tell patients medically incorrect
or scientifically invalid statements concerning abortion procedures, risks, side effects, alternatives,
or other such information. A provision of Arizona's SB 1318 -codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 36-2153(A)(2)(h)-(i)-is particularly outrageous. 6 It requires physicians to tell women, orally
and in person, that medication induced abortions are reversible and to refer them to a state-run
website containing information about reversal in order to obtain informed consent for any type of
abortion whatsoever.' Arkansas's more succinct informed consent provision mandates that doctors
tell women, orally and in person, "information on reversing the effects of abortion-inducing
drugs."'
Most laws requiring doctors to provide incorrect information to patients are not so
inventive, and instead rely on more conventional abortion myths. South Dakota is one state that,
as part of informed consent for an abortion, requires a physician to tell patients, in writing and in
person, that an increased risk of depression, suicidal ideation and suicide were "known medical
risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would
be subjected," despite the lack of credible studies supporting negative post-abortion
psychological outcomes.10 In Mississippi and Texas, clinicians must orally provide women
but that is outside this article's scope.

6

S.B. 1318, 52nd Leg., 1st. Reg. Sess (Ariz. 2015).

7

Id; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2153(A)(2)(h)-(i). There is no evidence that medication induced abortions

can be reversed. Doctors testifying in support of SB 1318 have claimed that the hormone progesterone can be used to stop
medication abortions; however, the only support for this assertion seems to be an article containing an incompletely
documented collection of anecdotes by physicians trying to counter the effects of mifepristone, the first part of a two-pill
combination used in medication abortions. David Grimes provides a detailed review of the various scientific errors
associated with the "study," including the use of a non-peer-reviewed progesterone developed by the founder of an
explicitly pro-life fertility clinic, a tiny sample size of six patients, a lack of control group, and the misuse of
epidemiological terms. For his complete assessment, see David Grimes, The 'Science' Behind Arizona's Mandatory
'Abortion Reversal' Advice, REWIRE (Apr. 8, 2015, 2:11 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/08/science-behindarizonas-mandatory-abortion-reversal-advice/ [https://perma.cc/FW76-T2PB].

8

Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1703(b)(1)(G)(West 2017).

9

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(e)(i)-(ii) (West 2016).

10

Abortions causing mental health problems is an enduring but scientifically baseless myth. The American

Psychological Association's Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion (TFMHA) produced a report evaluating the
scientific research on the mental health factors associated with abortion. In the Executive Summary of the Task Force
Report, the TMFHA stated that the majority of the literature on this subject "suffered from methodological problems, often
severe in nature," and accordingly "emphasized the studies it judged to be most methodologically rigorous to arrive at its
conclusions." The TFMHA concluded that relative risk of mental health problems among women receiving elective firsttrimester abortions and women who delivered a pregnancy were the same. Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion,
Executive Summary ofthe Task ForceReport, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/
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seeking abortions with false information about an increased risk of breast cancer as a consequence
of obtaining an abortion."
C. IdeologicalStatements Presentedas Facts

Laws in this grouping require doctors to present the state's ideological views about
abortion, such as when human life begins, as facts. These laws require doctors to disseminate the
pro-life viewpoint on this issue as if it were objective, medical truth. South Dakota's informed
consent law again serves as an ideal example: physicians must tell patients, in writing and in
person, that "the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being," and various assertions about the nature of her relationship with "that unborn human
being." 12 Indiana requires doctors to inform women seeking abortions, orally and in writing, that
"human physical life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.""
D. UnbalancedPresentationofInformation Obstructinga Neutral Medical Assessment

Laws in this category require physicians to give patients objectively truthful information,
but in an unbalanced manner that obstructs doctors' abilities to provide ideologically neutral
medical assessments. This compelled speech "demands the communication of irrelevant
information toward an arguably nonscientific ideological end." 14 Doctors may be required to
present only the risks of one treatment option but not another, perform medically irrelevant
procedures, or give information that is true but medically contraindicated.
Some mandatory ultrasound laws fall into this category. North Carolina's and Texas'
laws are particularly noteworthy because of the related litigation. North Carolina's law requires:
at least four hours before a woman having any part of an abortion performed or
induced, and before the administration of any anesthesia or medication in
preparation for the abortion on the woman, the physician who is to perform the
abortion, or qualified technician working in conjunction with the physician,
shall do each of the following:

women/programs/abortion/executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/57HH-GC59].
1
Miss. Code. Ann. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2017); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West 2015). This is another persistent but unfounded myth about abortion. See Abortion and
Breast Cancer, NATIONAL WOMEN'S HEALTH NETWORK, https://www.nwhn.org/abortion-and-breast-cancer-2/
[https://perma.cc/ART8-AN6M) (discussing the persistence of the mythical abortion-breast cancer link). Since 2003, the
National Cancer Institute and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have concluded no causal link
between abortions and breast cancer exists, and early studies suggesting otherwise were methodologically flawed. Studies
since then have continued to support their findings. Their 2009 report-reaffirmed in 2015-provides further details.
Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk, ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 434
(2009;
reaffirmed
2015),
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-onGynecologic-Practice/Induced-Abortion-and-Breast-Cancer-Risk [https://perma.cc/Z3Z8-BGTT].
12
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(B)-(D) (West 2016).
13
Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (West 2016).
14
See Haupt, supranote 1, at 1299 (discussing mandatory ultrasound requirements).
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(1) Perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the
pregnant woman.
(2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is
depicting, which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions
of the unborn child within the uterus and the number of unborn
children depicted. The individual performing the display shall offer the
pregnant woman the opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone. The image
and auscultation of fetal heart tone shall be of a quality consistent with
the standard medical practice in the community. If the image indicates
that fetal demise has occurred, a woman shall be informed of that fact.
(3) Display the images so that the pregnant woman may view them.
(4) Provide a medical description of the images, which shall include
the dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of external
members and internal organs, if present and viewable. 15
This law does not contain the typical informed consent exception allowing a doctor to
forgo providing information if, in his or her medical judgment, doing so would be harmful to a
patient's physical or psychological health, but does grant that "nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from
refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description." 16 The Texas law is
substantively similar; the most significant differences are that viewing the images is "optional""
but that patients are "required by law to hear an explanation of the sonogram images" except in
cases involving sexual assault, rape, other criminal activity, or fetal abnormality. " Again, there is
no exception for a physician's determination that presenting this information would be harmful.
II. PROFESSIONAL SPEECH IS ENTITLED TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Historically, the "Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First
Amendment contours of a professional's freedom to speak to a client," 1 9 and legal literature and
court decisions lack comprehensive theories of professional speech.2 0 In this context, scholars
have articulated "widely differing views of the constitutional status of professional speech[,]" 21
from maintaining that it is "fully protected, non-commercial speech"22 and vital to an individual's

18

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-21.85(a)(1)-(4) (West 2016).
Id. at (b).
But the sonogram must be performed so that the patient can see the images.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.012(a)(4)-(5) (West 2015).

19

Halberstam, supranote 1, 834 (1999).

20

"What is strikingly-and perhaps somewhat surprisingly-still absent from the case law and the legal

15

16
17

literature is a comprehensive theory of professional speech." Haupt, supranote 1, at 1241.
21
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, at 944.
22

Paula E. Berg, Toward a FirstAmendment Theory ofDoctor-PatientDiscourse and the Right to Receive

UnbiasedMedical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 201,242 (1994).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol21/iss1/2
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autonomous ability to communicate, 23 to contending the link between professional speech and
medical conduct that the state can regulate makes First Amendment protections for physician
speech within the doctor-patient context quite limited.2 4 Some scholars have analogized
professional speech to commercial speech to support physician speech protections, 25 but such
analogies fail to fully account for the unique nature of the doctor-patient relationship that entitles
it to greater First Amendment consideration.26
Below, I begin in Part A by discussing recent Supreme Court cases and theories of
professional speech as analogous to commercial speech. Parts B and C describe the unique First
Amendment concerns of doctors and patients, while Part D addresses criticisms of free speech
protection in this context.
A. Existing Frameworks: Recent Cases and Commercial Speech Analogies
1. Recent Cases Related to Professional Speech and Required Disclosures

The Supreme Court has not provided a clear framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of state interference with professional speech, but it has ruled on cases involving
commercial speech by professionals and required disclosures. Although the extent of their
potential application by courts is unclear, sometimes inconsistent, and does not directly address
constitutional issues related to the type of professional-client speech addressed here, these cases'
topical proximity means that they merit discussion.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,27 the Supreme

Court addressed limitations on lawyers' commercial speech. There, the Court upheld a state law
requiring attorneys to include only "purely factual and uncontroversial information" in their
advertisements. 28 Although this case involved speech by professionals, this speech occurred in a
commercial context outside of the professional-client relationship; thus, the Court treated the case
as solely dealing with commercial speech.29 This distinction between commercial speech made by
professionals and professional speech occurring within the professional-client relationship is
23

Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of Doctor-PatientSpeech Within the

Rehnquist Court's FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 174 (1998).

24
See Katharine McCarthy, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech Rights in the DoctorPatient Relationship, 56 ME. L. REv. 447, 464-65 (2004). She interprets the Supreme Court's decision in Casey, infra note
32, to mean that "the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment applies in limited circumstances within the
doctor-patient relationship, but that the state's interest in regulating physician conduct" derived from its police powers can
outweigh the free speech interests in the patient-physician context. McCarthy suggests that California could have limited
physician discussions about marijuana under its police powers, since "the states retain the power to regulate the
professional conduct of physicians, even when speech may be used to carry that conduct out." For the reasons discussed
infra, Part I.D.1, First Amendment protections for physician-patient speech do not prevent states from regulating the
medical profession.
25
See Part II.A., infra.
26
See Haupt, supra note 1, at 1264-68 (discussing theories of professional speech based on analogies to
commercial speech doctrine and noting their shortcomings).
27
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
28
Idat 2281.
29

Id
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echoed by some scholars, and has produced ambiguity as to whether Zauderer applies outside the
context of advertising.3 0 Additionally, there remains some uncertainty regarding Zauderer's
application to advancing legitimate state interests beyond preventing the deception of
consumers, 1 and the Supreme Court has declined to directly address this issue.32
Current case law on required disclosures by professionals also provides only minimal
guidance. In one of the most recent such cases, Milavetz v. United States," the Court evaded
addressing the ambiguity surrounding First Amendment protections for professional speech
through a narrow construction of the contested law. The Court upheld a federal law forbidding
lawyers from advising their clients to incur more debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy as
regulation of unethical and abusive conduct rather than protected speech.34 Although there was no
further elaboration on the free speech implications, this case at least suggests that a profession's
standards should and do play a significant role in delineating the boundaries of professional
speech protections.
2. Analogies to Commercial Speech

David Halberstam and Robert Post provide two influential frameworks for analyzing
professional speech through the lens of the more developed commercial speech literature. For
Halberstam, commercial speech and professional speech possess a "deep" theoretical "kinship,"36
as he considers them both "bounded speech institutions."3 7 He likens the "relational" aspect of the
vendor-customer dyad to the physician-patient situation,3 8 and suggests courts apply "a
constitutional theory of bounded speech institutions, based on its perception of various socially
See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., No. 13-5252, 2015 WL 5089667, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
18, 2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court's opinion in Zauderer is confined to advertising, emphatically and, one may infer,
intentionally").
31
Compare Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reiterating that the Zauderertest
is "limited to cases in which disclosure requirements are 'reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception
of consumers"') with Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the use of
Zaudereris not limited to cases where the state's interest is preventing consumer deception). See also Jennifer Keighley,
Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 542
(2012) (concluding that the "curing consumer deception" standard is only one of many permissible government goals).
There is also disagreement between Circuits. For a summary of such cases, see Amarei v. City of Chicago, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154992, 5-7 (N.D. Il. Nov. 17, 2015) (discussing the various approaches of courts and Circuits to this question).
32
The Supreme Court has had occasion to address the role of Zauderer in the abortion context. In
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (U.S. 1986), the Court struck down laws similar
to those discussed supra. The dissent, however, viewed these laws as legitimate regulations of the medical profession, and
cited Zauderer for support. Id. at 802-804. Thornburgh was later overruled in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992), discussed infra, Part ILD.
3
559 U.S. 229 (2010).
30

Id. at 244-246.
Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1290, 1350 (2015). This concept and
scholarly support for the use of the medical community's own standards are discussed extensively infra.
36
Halberstam, supranote 1, at 776-77.
34
35

3

Id. at 778.
Id at 851
.

38

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol21/iss1/2
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defined relationships between interlocutors and, accordingly, rendering contextual judgments
about the extent of government intervention that is both necessary for and compatible with the
preservation of the particular institution."3 He further argues that states may only regulate or
define the "boundaries of the discourse," 40 but not the content itself,41 and thus "[t]he government
may neither suppress the speech entirely nor remodel the institution [vendor-consumer or
physician-patient relationships] to its liking." 42
Post has a different view of the similarities between commercial and professional speech.
He argues that, unlike speech as part of public discourse, the focus of commercial and
professional speech is its informational value. 43 So, the guiding principle for the permissibility of
government interference with speech in these situations is the public's right to receive truthful,
non-misleading information." Thus, content- and viewpoint-based regulations and disclosure
requirements are permitted only when they ensure the accuracy and accessibility of information. 45
But Post complicates this analogy by distinguishing professional speech from
commercial speech on two grounds. 46 The first distinction - the dissemination of information
generally or to a specific client - may be obsolete with the expanding use of targeted advertising
in the commercial context.47 The second difference lies in the unequal power dynamic inherent in
the physician-patient relationship but not in the commercial context. 48
Although initially appealing, "the analogy to commercial speech should not be pressed
too far." 49 Not only does commercial speech have its own confusing, imprecise, and "tormented"
doctrinal history,50 but the qualitative differences between vendor-consumer and physician-patient
relationships make the First Amendment considerations in each context distinct. For instance,
despite Halberstam's concession that the "deeper relationship between physician and patient . .
lead[s], at least in some cases, to protection beyond that afforded to commercial speech," 5 his
version fails to fully account for the asymmetric power and knowledge dynamics in the doctorpatient context.
39

Id at 778.

40

Id at 857.
"The Court rejects government prescriptions as unconstitutional when they infringe on the integrity of an
established framework for discourse." Id at 828.
42
Id at 862.
41

43
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (2000); Post,
Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 974-75. Haupt further ties informational function expounded by Post to
First Amendment self-govemance concerns. Haupt, supranote 1, at 1268.
44
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 975.
45
Id Currently, the case law related to professional speech and required disclosures is somewhat unclear.
See Part II.A. 1, supra.
46

ROBERT

C. POST,

DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,

AND

ACADEMIC

FREEDOM:

A FIRST AMENDMENT

JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, 46-47 (2012)(referring to professional speech as "expert knowledge").

47
48

Id; Haupt, supranote 1, at 1268.
Cf Haupt, supra note 1, at 1268 (suggesting that "extensive psychological research on the part of
advertisers makes the speaker and the listener unequal in the commercial speech context as well. Product placement,
subconscious messaging, and the like give a distinct advantage to commercial speakers over their audiences").
49
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 980.
50
Id
51
Halberstam, supranote 1, at 838.
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Further, physicians and other professionals like lawyers often provide advice related to
constitutional rights or access to constitutionally guaranteed services like abortion.5 2 By
preventing professionals from informing clients of their rights and how to challenge violations of
these rights," restrictions on professional speech allow states to indirectly block the vindication of
constitutional rights. Because of knowledgeable physicians' fiduciary relationships with
emotionally vulnerable and relatively uninformed patients, special attention should be paid to the
First Amendment considerations of both doctor and patient within their professional relationship.
B. Physician-FocusedFirstAmendment Concerns

Although discussions of First Amendment concerns within the physician-patient dyad
often emphasize patients' rights, protection of physicians' speech stands on its own merits. First
Amendment considerations focused on physicians' rights as speakers are informed by doctors'
mutually reinforcing dual roles as advisors to patients and as participants in the wider medical
community. Doctors exchange and generate new medical knowledge as part of a community of
medical professionals, and then adapt, apply, and transmit that information in a way appropriate to
each patient's needs.5 4 In turn, physicians' clinical experience often influences the exchange and
generation of new medical knowledge within the greater medical community." The conceptual
placement of doctors' professional speech to patients within this wider sphere implicates
traditional protections for autonomy and development of the marketplace of ideas.5 6 Additionally,
professional speech related to the exercise of constitutional rights can serve an important role in
facilitating dialogue and public discourse outside of the immediate professional-client
relationship.
1. Autonomy

First Amendment rights fundamentally serve to protect an individual's right to autonomy
and self-determination, which traditionally has justified protections against governmentcompelled ideological speech." For these reasons, the "liberty" model posits that freedom of
speech is worth protecting for its value to the individual, without reference to larger societal
concerns.5 9 As Jennifer Keighley suggests,
52

Zick, supra note 35, at 1295 ("professionals are frequently involved in educating, facilitating, and
mediating the enjoyment and exercise of clients' constitutional rights").
53
See id at 1294 ("These regulations suppress, alter, or dictate professional rights speech-professionalclient communications about, concerning, or relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights").
54
See Haupt, supra note 1, at 1269-70 (conceptualizing physicians as members of a "knowledge
community").
55
See id (discussing the doctor's role within the wider knowledge community).
56
Id Haupt also states that democratic self-governance interests are implicated independent of the effect of
the listener, but does not provide much reasoning to support this assertion. Id. at 1276-77.
57
See Zick, supra note 35, at 1316 (discussing the overlooked role of professional speech and advice in
public discourse related to constitutional rights).
58
Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory UltrasoundLaws: The FirstAmendment's Limit
on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2373 (2013).
59
Id (citing C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
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This interest in individual liberty and autonomy, in fact, is one of the primary
justifications for restricting the state's ability to compel citizens to engage in the
state's ideological speech. While physicians may have more limited autonomy
interests when engaging in the practice of medicine, this does not mean that
they surrender all of their ordinary First Amendment rights against compelled
ideological speech. Physicians retain the core First Amendment right of
ordinary citizens to refuse to be the mouthpiece for the state's ideological
advocacy. 60
In addition to individual autonomy interests, physicians have autonomy interests relevant
to their place in the learned medical community. 61 The medical community has its own interests in
maintaining its independence to continue developing, refining, and transmitting the specialized
scientific information that makes it socially valuable. 62 In Paul Horwitz's words, "expertise based
on a body of specialized knowledge is the very basis of the value and legitimacy" of professional
speech. 63 Converting individual doctors into "mouthpieces for the state's ideological advocacy"
would undermine the integrity of the medical profession as a whole and its ability to advance
scientific knowledge and social welfare. Therefore, in addition to universal autonomy interests,
physicians have a unique interest in communicating in line with acceptable medical standards and
without ideological impositions by the state.6
2. Marketplace of Ideas
Although "the professional does not seek to subject her professional opinion" to the
competition of the marketplace of ideas "when speaking within the confines of the professionalclient relationship," these interactions do implicate First Amendment protections for the
marketplace of ideas. 65 Every profession has an internal marketplace of ideas which advances the
formation of professional knowledge. 66 Considering the mutually reinforcing relationship between
the generation of new information and clinical experience, interfering with physician-patient
67
speech necessarily affects the development of new ideas within the wider medical community.
Preventing states from interjecting ideological propaganda into medical settings thus complements
966 (1978)).
60

Id. Even an opportunity to repudiate the required speech will not cure the harm of compelled ideological

speech; compelling an individual to speak contrary to his or her beliefs is, in and of itself, and infringement on personal

liberty. See W. Va. State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelling a flag salute
"transcend[ed] constitutional limitations" and infringed on free speech and personal liberties); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986) ("Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to
propound political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could require
speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.").
61
Haupt, supranote 1, at 1272.
62
Id
63

64

PAUL HORwITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 248 (2012).

Haupt, supranote 1, at 1272-73.

65

Id

66

Id at 1274-75.

67

Id
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doctors' professional autonomy interests and helps preserve the integrity of the discourse and the
medical community's "search for truth."68
Further, professional-client speech, and particularly advice related to constitutional
rights, can have broader implications for public discourse. Government lies-here, using
physicians as mouthpieces-"pose especially grave instrumental threats to democratic selfgovernance in contexts where such deliberate falsehoods are unlikely to be addressed by
counterspeech" and when misrepresentations are used to manipulate the public's assessment of
differing policy options. 69
These concerns exist when states conscript physicians to perpetuate misinformation
related to reproductive health. Even though professional speech to clients occurs in a private
setting, it still has public value and can influence public discourse regarding reproductive rights.
As Zick states,
Far more often than is typically acknowledged, professional-client interactions
address issues relating to constitutional and other legal rights. Licensed
professionals play an important role in ensuring the free flow of accurate
information about constitutional rights. They educate clients with respect to the
scope and exercise of rights. Their advice may provoke political activism with
respect to rights. More generally, professionals facilitate the exercise of a wide
variety of rights. Thus, restrictions on professional communications may affect
far more than the provision of professional advice regarding a client's personal
concerns. Some restrictions may impact discussions and decisions regarding the
exercise of civil and constitutional rights relating to matters such as
reproductive rights and racial equality."0
Thus, since state interference with physician speech can stifle public discourse on
important constitutional issues and harm the marketplace of ideas, such speech should be
protected.
C. Patient-CenteredFirstAmendment Concerns

In the physician-patient context, various factors create an unequal power dynamic that
renders patients particularly susceptible to state ideological coercion or indoctrination, including:
doctors' monopoly on medical knowledge and the resulting informational asymmetry; physicians'
relatively high social status; patients' emotional and/or physical vulnerability; and difficulty
discriminating between the state's and the physician's message. Patients' positions as "captive
audiences" in a private setting have additional implications for their ability to avoid unwanted
state ideological intrusions. In this context, state ideological imposition can obstruct patients'
68

Id.; see also Helen Norton, The Government's Lies andthe Constitution, 91

Ind.

L.J. 73, 102 (2015):

government lies can frustrate the search for truth and the dissemination of knowledge ...

Just as

government efforts to prohibit the expression of certain views contrary to its own can undermine
First Amendment enlightenment values, so too can be the case of government lies that successfully
distort public discussion of a particular matter or viewpoint.
69
Norton, supranote 68, at 10 1-02.
70

Zick, supranote 35, at 1316.
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receipt of unbiased information, threaten their ability to make independent decisions, distort their
choices, and ultimately undermine their bodily and decisional autonomy.n Because such choices
often involve vindication of constitutional rights or access to constitutionally guaranteed services,
interference with patients' ability to receive accurate and unbiased advice is especially troubling.72
1. Unequal Power Dynamic Creates Susceptibility to Indoctrination

Doctors are informed intermediaries for their patients, adapting and translating the
medical community's knowledge into something individual patients can use to make informed
treatment decisions." Patients "are presumed to be dependent upon professional judgment and
unable themselves independently to evaluate its quality,"7 4 as "the average patient has little or no
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision."" Further, doctors have a "monopoly"
on medical knowledge, making it difficult for patients to assess the accuracy of physicians' advice
by consulting sources outside the profession.76 Although patients ultimately decide what course of
treatment to pursue, they rely on physicians' expert advice and trust that it is unbiased and based
on scientific and medical considerations.7 Patients seek out doctors' advice precisely for these
reasons.7 8

Even if patients considered other sources of information, they likely would defer to the
doctor's opinion. 79 To their patients, physicians have "immense authority and power" derived not
only from their superior knowledge and education, but also from their "prestigious and economic
social status and the 'charismatic authority' that derives from their symbolic role as conquerors of
disease and death." 0 Combined with the emotional and physical vulnerability of seeking medical
treatment, patients have limited capacity to utilize "critical rationality and inquisitiveness [to]
neutralize the coercive effect of government messages that are delivered by physicians."" Also, in
this context, patients will have difficulty distinguishing between the physician's scientificallybacked advice and the state's message, particularly if ideological statements are couched in
medical terminology that patients may not understand.82 Thus, "patients are likely to give great
71
define this as the listener's ability to make decisions independently. Here, it is particularly important
with regard to the psychological or physical integrity of the patient. Although our definitions are not exactly the same, see
Haupt, supra note 1, at 1270 (discussing listener's "decisional autonomy interests").
72
Zick, supranote 35, at 1294.

n

See Part ILB., supra.

74

POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 47 (2012).

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See Paula Berg, supra note 22, 257-58 (1994) (discussing the particular First Amendment concerns when
"an information marketplace is monopolized by only a few speakers").
n
See Haupt, supranote 1, at 1271 (discussing the knowledge asymmetry between doctors and patients).
75
76

78

See id.

79
80

Berg, supranote 22, at 226.
Id. at 225-26.

81

1d. at 229.

Id. at 257 (stating that "patients' critical capacities may be further impeded when a government message
is disguised as medical advice rather than presented as an expression of state opinion"); Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed
82
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weight to physicians' expressions of state preferences, not because they are persuaded by the
messages, but merely because the messages are delivered by physicians." 3 Finally, a patient's
position as a "captive audience" compounds the coercive effect of state-compelled ideological
speech by physicians. 84
2. Patient Rights
For the reasons discussed above, patients are particularly susceptible to ideological
coercion when the state's message is delivered during a medical consultation. "Decisional
autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its
own views of what is best." 85 "Just as viewpoint-based regulation of the content of political
speech distorts political decision making and infringes on citizens' constitutional right to
determine their political destiny, viewpoint-based regulation of medical speech distorts medical
decision making, and thus infringes on patients' constitutional right to determine the destiny of
their bodies." 86 Such interference is especially troubling from a constitutional perspective due to
patients' reliance on physicians' advice for information about and access to constitutionally
guaranteed rights and services like abortion. 87 As a result, state ideological interference in patientdoctor discourse can substantially interfere with patients' liberty of thought, undermine their
psychological and bodily autonomy, and impermissibly obstruct the exercise of constitutional
rights.
a. UnwantedIdeolozicalIntrusions

Unwanted ideological intrusion through compelled physician ideological speech
threatens patient autonomy. Supreme Court jurisprudence implies a right to be free from
unwanted ideological intrusion by the government or other citizens, particularly within a private
setting." For instance, the First Amendment prevents the government from forcing captive
audiences to listen to unwanted propaganda. 89 Forcing captive audiences to listen to ideological
speech threatens their autonomy by "intruding" on their "mental processes" and subverts their

Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 Wa. U. J. of L. & Pol'y 11, 48
(2016) ("Where informed consent mandates require physicians to communicate messages dictated by the state, there is a
substantial risk that patient-listeners will not recognize the true origins of the speech.").
83
Berg, supra note 22, at 229. Due to the dynamics of physician-patient interactions, even explicit
repudiation of the state's ideological message is not enough to cure this problem. See id at 225-30 (stating that patients are
particularly vulnerable to coercion and will likely be confused and unduly influenced by state ideological messages
communicated by physicians, even when there are disclaimers). See also Sawicki, supra note 82, at 50 ("even messages
that are clearly identified as state-sponsored may be problematic when compelled in the specific context of medical
care ... intervention of a government message into a sphere that patients expect to be a locus of professional independence
may jeopardize the trust inherent in the physician-patient relationship").
84
See Part J.C.2, infra.
85
Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86
Berg, supranote 22, at 221.
87
Zick, supranote 35, at 1294.
88
Berg, supranote 22, at 251-52.
89

Id For an extensive list of Supreme Court cases evoking this right, see id at 252 n. 247.
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personal liberty,90 and these concerns are especially urgent when government propaganda is
involved.9 1
In the physician-patient relationship, patients are a captive audience: patients cannot alter
the trajectory of the conversation; 92 the messages are conveyed in medical terms and are not
clearly ideological statements imposed by the state; it occurs in a setting where such messages are
unexpected; medical consultation involves face-to-face, one-on-one interaction; physicians are
viewed as authority figures and have high social status; and access to needed or desired medical
care is predicated on complying with the state's requirements. 93
The private, rather than public, setting in which this ideological intrusion occurs triggers
more solicitude for captive audience concerns. Lately, the Supreme Court has been unsympathetic
to listeners' rights to avoid unwanted speech in public;94 however, even Justices particularly
skeptical of captive audience doctrine have acknowledged its validity in private areas. 95 Further,
the Court has protected individuals' rights to not engage in undesired conversation or receive
unwanted solicitations, even of a political nature, on their private property and in the home. 96
Such solicitude for listeners' rights at the costs of speakers' rights is noteworthy, as the Court has
consistently supported speakers' rights in public. 97 Finally, since the First Amendment protects
individuals and not the government,98 the analysis here weighs even more heavily in favor of

90
91
92

Id. at 252.
See id. at 252-53 n. 250 (discussing Pollak, particularly Justice Black's concurrence).
Although nothing "prevent[s] a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or

from refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description." N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-21.85(b).
93

For example, receiving a medically unnecessary ultrasound. See Part II.C.1, supra.

94

See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458-459 (2011) (holding that although the speech was offensive or

upsetting, that Snyder could not be held liable for it because it was in a public place and relevant to a public issue; further,
that even though the unwilling audience was at a funeral, that did not trigger protections for them as a captive audience and
that the burden fell on the listener to avoid hearing or seeing the offensive speech); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2529 (2014) (As a general rule, in such a [public] forum the government may not "selectively ... shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others").

95

See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 751-53 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia

harshly criticized the majority for recognizing a "right to be let alone" in public spaces, he acknowledged and even
approved of a line of cases permitting limitations on speakers' First Amendment rights when they intrude into the privacy
of the home. He also implied that the First Amendment protects a speaker's right to be free from government interference
with their speech.
96
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (upholding a statute allowing a homeowner to

restrict the delivery of mail to his home); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (upholding a statute prohibiting
picketing "before or about" any individual's residence); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002) (striking down an ordinance but recognizing an individual's "unquestioned right to
refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors" and to post "No Solicitation" signs to protect themselves from
unwanted speech or other privacy intrusions).

97

See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("handing out leaflets in the

advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint ... is the essence of First Amendment expression"; "[n]o form of speech
is entitled to greater constitutional protection"); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377
(1997) ("Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the
First Amendment").
98
See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
(1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that the First Amendment protects the freedoms of individuals and "confers no analogous protection
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listeners' rights. Although the home may be a constitutionally special space, 99 the privacy interests
and expectations in medical settings are also quite high, 100 and so similar protections should
apply.
b. Access to UnbiasedInformation

The right to have access to unbiased information is a close conceptual cousin of the
interest in freedom from unwanted ideological intrusions. Patients need accurate information to
make autonomous, informed decisions about their healthcare,1 01 and compelling physicians to
deliver ideological messages "may result in a biased description of available treatments, thus
distorting patients' understanding of their medical choices and undermining patient autonomy and
consent."1 02
Many of the same concepts and cases that support protecting patients from unwanted
ideological intrusions underwrite patients' right to access unbiased, accurate information.1 03
Manipulating listeners through lies and misrepresentations harms their autonomy and dignity:1 04
The most irreducibly bad thing about lies is that they contrive to interfere with,
and to impair, our natural effort to apprehend the real state of affairs. They are
designed to prevent us from being in touch with what is really going on. In
telling his lie, the liar tries to mislead us into believing that the facts are other
than they actually are. He tries to impose his will on us.05
Government lying-here, by using physicians as conscripted mouthpieces for lies and

on the Government" (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-39) (Stewart, J., concurring))). Although
beyond this article's scope, it is an interesting, unsettled question whether states and local governments have First
Amendment protections against the federal government. See generally, Eugene Volokh, Do State and Local Governments
Have Free Speech Rights?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/06/24/do-state-and-local-govemments-have-free-speech-rights
[https://perma.cc/X9A6-PAKG];

David Fagundes, State Actors as FirstAmendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637, 1638-39 (2006).
99

See Hill, 530 U.S. at 751-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying upon the "'unique nature of the home,'

citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 484 (1988)).
100
Laws like HIPAA and the social norm of privacy surrounding medical appointments
and issues,
especially in the reproductive context, support this. Medical offices are even designed to advance privacy and avoid
intrusion into doctor-patient interactions: examination rooms are often separated from the waiting area and patients are
usually seen in private rooms. Also, doctors typically request permission for medical students and other trainees to observe
consultations or examinations.
101
Although this point is rather obvious, see generally Berg, supranote 22.
102

Id at 251.

103

See Part II.C.2.a., supra for a more detailed discussion. Although increasingly disfavored, the Supreme

Court's First Amendment "fairness doctrine" addressing the issue of bias in broadcasting weighs in favor of patient access
to unbiased information in the medical sphere. For a more detailed analysis in the medical context, see Berg, supra note
22, at 255-56 (discussing the "fairness doctrine" in light of compelled physician speech).
104
Norton, supra, at 68.

105

Id (quoting Harry Frankfurt, On Truth, Lies, andBullshit, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION
37,

37 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009)).
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misrepresentations-creates additional, more tangible problems, particularly when such lies
coerce individuals to waive constitutional rights. According to Helen Norton, government lies in
the context of abortion meet this threshold of coercion under the Due Process Clause:
[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that laws subjecting women seeking
abortions to the government's inaccurate or misleading speech about abortionpresumably including, but not limited to, government lies about the legal or
health consequences of abortion-can pose an impermissible undue burden to a
woman's reproductive rights. Although to date courts' discussion of this
possibility has been very cursory, we might understand such lies as coercive of
women's reproductive choices. Indeed, the Court has suggested in other
contexts that women seeking abortions at health care facilities can be considered
"'captive' by medical circumstance[s]" (i.e., with limited possibilities for exit or
rebuttal)-a dynamic that increases the potential for coercion.106
Further,
[g]overnment lies on certain topics or to certain audiences may be especially
successful in manipulating listeners because they may be more likely to be
believed and less amenable to rebuttal by counterspeech;"10 7 in particular, "[t]he
coercive effects of such lies may also increase if the government requires that
they be uttered by health care providers upon whom patients rely for trusted and
expert advice. 08
This Due Process analysis intersects with the First Amendment concerns under
discussion here:
[T]he most powerful argument in favor of government authority to restrict
deception, and the most powerful argument against government-imposed
deception, are the same: the manipulative, domineering, and fundamentally
disrespectful invasion of autonomy worked by deception." 1 09 Just as
government laws that require or prohibit certain beliefs undermine individual
autonomy, so too may be the case of government lies that manipulate their
listeners into adopting beliefs or expression of the government's choice. Such
government lies can be especially effective in manipulating listeners when
directed to a vulnerable or captive audience where neither exit nor rebuttal is a

106

See id at 96.

107

Id at 79.

108

Id at 96 (citing Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama andBeyond Observations on the ProspectofFact

Checking Executive Department Threat Claims before the Use of Force, 26 Const. Comment. 433, 443 (2010))(citing

Robert C. Post, SubsidizedSpeech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 172-75(1996)).
109

Id at 101 (citing Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the FirstAmendment: A Cental, Complex, and

Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1107, 1110 (2006)).
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meaningful option. . . "o
Due to the physician-patient relationship's character, patients are particularly vulnerable
to manipulation when doctors are used to propagate government lies and misrepresentations. "The
nature of the professional-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties. To bridge the
knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the client's decisional autonomy interests, the
professional has to communicate "information that is accurate (under the knowledge community's
current assessment), reliable, and personally tailored to the [patient's] specific situation.""
Because the patient is particularly vulnerable to ideological coercion or indoctrination in the
medical setting and unable to independently evaluate the accuracy of the information, the state
undermines this defining aspect of the physician-patient relationship when it compels doctors to
convey falsehoods. Since the ultimate decision rests with patients,H2 ideologically manipulating
the information available distorts their decision-making process and undermines their agency and
decisional autonomy.
This information manipulation is especially troubling considering patients' reliance on
physicians for information about and access to constitutionally guaranteed rights and services like
abortion." Although other professionals have a much more prominent role in advising clients
about constitutional rights,11 4 patients often rely on physicians and other medical professionals for
information pertaining to the exercise of constitutional rights. A particularly relevant example is
the physician's role as a source of information for patients about "products, devices, and
procedures that affected the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to
use contraception and to procure an abortion."" For the reasons discussed earlier, a patient may
not be able to get accurate information about how to exercise their right to access contraception or
abortion through any source other than a physician, and will be likely to believe that information
provided by a physician is correct and exhaustive. So, interfering with a physician's ability to
provide this information seriously infringes on the patient's right to receive accurate information
and inhibits the autonomous exercise of these constitutional rights. Thus, because physician
professional speech "fosters individual autonomy and self-determination," it should be "protected
in order to maintain the integrity of the individual and protect private decision making from undue

110

Id. at 102 (citing Jeffrey M. Cohen, The Right to Learn: Intellectual Honesty and the FirstAmendment,

29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 659, 683 (2012)).

I"

Haupt, supranote 1, at 1271.

112

Id

113

Zick, supranote 35, at 1294.
Lawyers are the obvious example. As Zick
observes,

114

lawyers are frequently 'vindicators of constitutional rights against the state.' Lawyers' advice and
other professional activities can have a profound impact on the scope and enjoyment of
constitutional rights for individual clients and the public at large. Through their expressive activities,
including the advice they provide to individual clients, lawyers frequently seek to check
governmental power and protect the constitutional rights of clients. Id. at 1316 (citing Kathleen
Sullivan, Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on FirstAmendment

Rights, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 569, 571 (1998)).
115

See id. at 1317 (discussing challenges to laws preventing physicians from advising patients on services

or products they were constitutionally entitled to access).
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government intrusion." 11 6
D. Criticisms ofFirstAmendment Protections in the Physician-PatientContext

Many criticisms of First Amendment protections for physician-patient speech focus on
concerns about the state's ability to regulate the profession 17 and on the continued validity of
informed consent laws." Regulating the medical profession and informed consent laws can serve
laudable ends; but, First Amendment protections for professional speech do not preclude the
benefits of either.
1. Regulation of the Medical Profession

First Amendment protection for professional speech would not harm a state's ability to
regulate the medical profession because the three main areas of such regulations-advertising,
access to the profession, and unauthorized practice-do not involve professional speech119
"uttered in the course of professional practice." 1 20 Advertising is not professional speech because
it does not entail the provision of medical advice to a patient.12 1 Determining licensing
requirements and educational and other fitness standards for the profession deal with an
individual's ability to become a doctor, not a physician's speech to patients during the practice of
medicine.1 22 Finally, unauthorized practice regulation "polices the formation of a professionalclient relationship rather than the communication of professional advice within such a
relationship." 12 3 Thus, the state has extensive latitude to regulate the medical profession without
interfering with professional speech.
Another type of state professional "regulation"-the malpractice tort-does concern
speech by physicians to patients.1 24 The tort regime addresses bad advice; that is, inaccurate
advice inconsistent with professional standards defined by the medical community. 125 Professional
116
Berg, supranote 22, at 234 (citing C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom ofSpeech,
25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978)).
117
See, e.g., Katherine McCarthy, supra note 24 (disapproving of a Ninth Circuit ruling invalidating a law
on physician free speech grounds, arguing that the ruling impermissibly undermines the state's ability to regulate the
medical profession).
118
See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 82, at 15 ("If the First Amendment imposes substantial limits on the type
of physician speech that states can compel, then every state informed consent law-from the most benign to the most
controversial-is potentially at risk.").
119
Haupt, supranote 1, at 1277.
120
See Haupt, supra note 1, at 843; Post, supranote 1, at 947; Haupt, supranote 1, at 1238 n.1.
121
See id at 1280-82 (explaining that advertising is commercial speech, not professional speech, as "[t]he
professional advertising her services is not speaking as part of the knowledge community to transmit advice to a client. She
speaks only as a private commercial actor.").
122
See Haupt, supra note 1, at 1282-83 (suggesting that establishing barriers to entry does not directly
affect professional speech).
123
Id. at 1283.
124
Id. at 1285.
125
See id. at 1285-86 ("Malpractice liability ensures that the professional's speech accurately communicates
the knowledge community's insights within the professional-client relationship ..
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speech protections are based on the physician's interest in transmitting the accurate scientific
knowledge of the medical community and the patient's interest in receiving accurate medical
information;126 so, inaccurate information that does not convey the medical community's
scientific understanding is arguably not professional speech.12 7 Further, liability is based on
deviation from standards of care set by the professional community, not by the state; 1 28 the state
may hold physicians liable for "bad speech," but physicians define what speech is good or bad.
The First Amendment "vests the people, not the state, with the right to determine truth and falsity
for themselves," 1 2 9 so a malpractice scheme where the profession decides what speech is accurate
is consistent with First Amendment values. 130 Thus, since "liability [in the malpractice scheme] is
properly measured against the standard of care determined by the profession, the knowledge
community's formation of this standard should remain uncorrupted and its application within the
131
professional-client relationship should receive robust First Amendment protection."
2. Informed Consent

Some commentators believe "if the First Amendment imposes substantial limits on the
type of physician speech that states can compel, then every state informed consent law-from the
most benign to the most controversial-is potentially at risk." 1 3 2 This alarm is unwarranted;
professional speech protections and informed consent are derived from the same principles and
protect the same First Amendment interests, and so can coexist.
a. Informed Consent Generally

The doctrine of informed consent addresses informational asymmetries by increasing the
flow of accurate information to patients.13 3 Some argue that to achieve this goal, states must be
able to mandate physicians disclose particular information. 1 34 But, specific mandated disclosures
instead endanger the interests informed consent promotes: rather than reducing the informational
asymmetry between doctors and patients, states have used physicians as unwilling ideological
mouthpieces to effectively indoctrinate patients by taking advantage of patients' relative
he treats a patient in a way that deviates from the norms established by the medical profession.") (internal quotations
omitted).
126

See Parts IIB-C., supra.

See Haupt, supra note 1, at 1285-87 (discussing how liability for "unprofessional speech" does not
negatively impact protections for professional speech).
127

128

Id at 1286.

129

Berg, supranote 22, at 223.
See id at 223-24, n. 118 (contending that the primary goal of the First Amendment is to prevent the

130

government from dictating truth and falsehood and ensuring people have the opportunity to decide for themselves).
131
Haupt, supranote 1, at 1244-45.
132
133
134

Sawicki, supra note 82, at 15.
Berg, supranote 22, at 230.
See David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, Robert H. McKinney School of Law

Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-31, at 3 (arguing that informed consent is best viewed "as a carve-out from
standard First Amendment doctrine," and thus "as long as the state is mandating speech that serves the goals of informed
consent, the requirements should not raise First Amendment concerns.").
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ignorance and inability to independently assess the validity of medical information. 13
Although some contend that patients could be protected against such ideological
impositions by a requirement that "mandated speech be truthful and not misleading"13 6 or convey
"purely factual and uncontroversial information,"' these standards beg the questions: what is
"truthful and not misleading," "purely factual and uncontroversial," and who decides?' If the
state makes this determination, then such a requirement easily becomes mere pretense. 139 Perhaps
courts could decide, but they often lack the same level of medical and scientific expertise as
physicians and may be prone to the same ideological biases as state legislatures.14 0 If physicians
themselves decide what is truthful, the requirement merely reiterates traditional "informed consent
laws, which establish standards for disclosure but leave the specific content to the physician's
discretion," that satisfy both patient and physician First Amendment concerns. 1 41
Another variation of the argument that particular mandated disclosures are necessary for
informed consent avers that physicians are providing biased information to their patients in favor
of abortion and that the state must step in to correct this imbalance and ensure patients are fully
informed. 142 Even assuming the claims of bias were true, the mandated speech in the laws above
does not advance the claimed interest in ensuring informed consent. First, the laws that provide
incorrect information or purely ideological information masked as fact clearly harm, not further,
the state's interest in informed consent: rather than increasing the patient's knowledge, such
inaccuracies decrease the patient's factual understanding and thus reduce her capability to
independently assess the situation and make decisions accordingly. Such misinformed consent
thus undermines informed consent.
As for "truthful" but one-sided statements in favor of a pro-birth stance, the state does
not ensure that women are fully informed and receive a balanced representation of options by
merely exchanging physicians' alleged ideological bias for its own. Even worse, since this probirth speech is required of all physicians, patients have no opportunity to receive information
contrary to the state's ideological stance, whereas even in the case of widespread bias among a
See Berg, supranote 22, at 230-31 (criticizing the Rehnquist Court for "fail[ing] to see that the qualities
of doctor-patient interaction that increase the risk of coercion by physicians also lead to a heightened risk of coercion by
government when physicians are deputized into ideological service.").
136
Orentlicher, supranote 134, at 9.
135

Sawicki, supra note 82, at 14.
For a discussion of these questions and the difficulties current Supreme Court jurisprudence poses in
regard to answering them, see id. at 14-23.
139
For examples, one need only refer to the laws supra, Part I.B.
140
See Part IV., infra.
141
Berg, supranote 22, at 263-64. This traditional model of informed consent is also consistent with the
concept of the First Amendment as having the primary goal of preventing the government from dictating truth and
falsehood and ensuring people have the opportunity to decide for themselves. Id. at 223-24, n. 118.
142
See, e.g., Americans United for Life, Right to Know Act: Model Legislation and Policy
Guide at 5,
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11 /WRTK-Informed-Consent-2013-LG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MMNVN3B] (stating, as part of proposed legislation, that "Many abortion facilities or providers hire untrained and
unprofessional 'counselors' to provide pre-abortion counseling, but whose primary goal is actually to 'sell' or promote
abortion services"); National Right to Life Committee, The State of Abortion in the United States at 33 (Jan. 2016),
http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/communications/stateofabortion20l6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT4M-4KF5] (suggesting that
pro-choice advocates want to withhold information from women in order to encourage them to get abortions).
137

138
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knowledge community, there will be practitioners with differing views that patients could consult
for a second opinion.14 3 If states are concerned about physician bias, the general principle of
informed consent as determined by the medical community-to tell patients the relevant risks and
benefits of procedures, other possible options, and the risks and benefits of these alternativesalready provides an adequate, ideologically balanced standard. If physicians are indeed failing to
adhere to this community-determined standard within a specific medical context, patients already
have recourse to medical malpractice and the tort system. Indeed, even in Casey itself, discussed
infra, the language required physicians to disclose the risks of both childbirth and abortion to
patients, and not just one or the other, as part of ensuring informed consent. 144 Thus, trading one
alleged bias for another would not further the interest in an informed decision.
b. State Interest in Dissuasionand Casey

A final contention meriting discussion here is that such particularized disclosures are
permissible because they advance a state's legitimate interest in dissuading women from obtaining
abortions under Casey. But, even under the relatively restrictive view of physician free speech
assumed in Casey, the particularized disclosures contained in the laws above do not properly
advance these interests.
Casey145 simultaneously departed from prior Supreme Court jurisprudence according
broad respect for non-interference with physician speech and recognized that states have a
legitimate interest in dissuading women from obtaining abortions. Casey involved the
constitutionality of amendments to a Pennsylvania statute, 146 including additions to the "informed
consent" provision requiring physicians to tell every abortion-seeking patient (regardless of her
individual medical needs) 147 about the health risks of abortion and childbirth and the probable
gestational age of the fetus. 148 These regulations were put in place specifically to further the
state's ideological preference for childbirth over abortion, as explicitly stated in the statute
itself 149 The Supreme Court dismissed any First Amendment concerns in an unfortunately cursory
manner;15 0 and, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested
143
Indeed, even a cursory Google search produces a substantial number of anti-choice physician advocacy
groups and practitioners.
144
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(a)(1)(ii) (1990)). The provision allowed
the doctor to withhold the disclosures if he determined they would be harmful to the patient, consistent with the medical
community's existing standards regarding informed consent. Id. at 883-84.
145
See the more detailed discussion, infra at Section III.A.

146
1988 Pub. L. 262, No. 31, § 4; 1989 Pub. L. 592, No. 64, § 2 (amending Abortion Control Act, 1982
Pub. L. 476, No. 138, § 1 (codified as amended at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1993))).
147
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205(a)(1)(i), (iii) (1983 & Supp. 1993).
148
149

Id. § 3205(a)(1)(ii).
See Id. § 3202(c):

In every relevant civil or criminal proceeding in which it is possible to do so without violating the
Federal Constitution, the common and statutory law of Pennsylvania shall be construed so as to
extend to the unborn the equal protection of the laws and to further the public policy of this
Commonwealth encouraging childbirth over abortion.
150
Despite the free speech implications of these rules, the Supreme Court's Casey plurality opinion ducked
a close First Amendment analysis of the informed consent provisions. See Berg, supranote 22, at 215 n. 85 (discussing the
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that the government may compel doctors to give patients any "relevant" information (defined as
able to "create some uncertainty or persuade") that is rationally related to a state's legitimate
interest,"1 ' including encouraging a woman to continue a pregnancy.
But the state's right to encourage women to carry pregnancies to term is hardly limitless;
although Casey indeed permits a state to clearly articulate its own ideological preference, such
laws dealing with informed consent should still be designed to ensure a "mature" and "informed"
decision.15 2 States may only persuade, and cannot coerce, women into carrying a pregnancy to
term; the state's legitimate interest ends when persuasion becomes coercion. 15
For the myriad reasons already discussed, forcing doctors to provide falsehoods,
ideological messages disguised as facts, and one-sided information about risks and benefits of
possible medical treatments is sufficiently coercive to invalidate these statutes. The knowledge
monopolies of physicians and informational asymmetries, the trust placed in physicians by
patients, the difficulty distinguishing the state's ideological insertions from the physician's own
scientifically-backed advice, and emotional and physical vulnerability of captive patients-who
sometimes are literally naked and undergoing a procedure at the time they are receiving the state's
misinformation-renders these laws coercive. Moreover, this coercion seeks to prevent the
exercise of constitutional rights. Thus, informed consent does not undermine protections for
professional speech 54 and mandating disclosures does not further the patient-oriented goals of
informed consent.

pleadings and lack of First Amendment analysis in the opinion). Instead, the Court evaluated impositions on speech within
the general test for whether a law places an "undue burden" on a patient's right to choose. Casey, 112 U.S. at 876. The
plurality expressly overruled earlier jurisprudence forbidding governments from using physician-patient consultation to
promote its ideological viewpoints "to the extent that we permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life
of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the
State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion." Id. at 2824. For a more detailed discussion, see Berg, supra note
22, at 217. First Amendment concerns were summarily dismissed, as the Court merely considered advising patients to be
"part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
151
Id. at 2867-68; Berg, supra note 22, at 217 n. 95 (discussing Rehnquist's proposed standard). This
standard is lower than that for commercial speech, in spite of the compelling reasons for providing higher protections for
professional speech. SeePart II.B.,C., supra. Regulation of commercial speech "must be based on a substantial government
interest and be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." Berg, supranote 22, 218.
152
Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
153

Id. at 877-78, 930; see also Zick, supranote 35, at 21.

154

As Haupt puts it:

The scope of disclosure is bound only by what is material to medical, as opposed to non-medical,
interests. Cabining the information that physicians must disclose to that which is material to
patients' medical decisions avoids holding physicians accountable for matters that go beyond their
expertise. It is again the knowledge community's professional knowledge that circumscribes the
relevant information. And it is therefore necessary to keep the knowledge community's informationformation process free from outside interference. Thus, imposing an informed consent requirement
does not technically restrict the professional's First Amendment rights if appropriate disclosure is
considered a part of medically necessary information flow within the doctor-patient relationship. It
is 'unprofessional speech-or 'unprofessional' silence-that is punished.
Haupt, supra note 1, at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. APPLICATION TO EXISTING LAWS

Considering the discussion above, the first two categories of abortion laws compelling
physician speech-requiring doctors to 1) tell patients factually false or misleading assertions or
2) present ideological statements as facts-clearly impair the First Amendment values
surrounding physician speech. Forcing physicians to give patients factually false information
undermines physicians' individual and professional autonomy interests, undermines the medical
profession's integrity, and interferes with the formation and exchange of ideas within the larger
medical intellectual community.' Further, it adversely affects broader public discourse related to
issues such as reproductive rights and abortion.15 6
Such provisions also harm patients' decisional autonomy by preventing them from
having the accurate information necessary to make informed, independent decisions about their
bodies and medical treatment."' Making doctors present ideological statements as facts likewise
infringes on physicians' First Amendment interests. 15' Injecting ideological statements into
physician-patient dialogue is particularly insidious; not only does this form of presentation block
patients' access to accurate information, but the state is taking advantage of patients' particularly
vulnerable position due to anxiety and informational asymmetries. 159 This manipulation is
especially egregious considering physicians' roles in educating patients about how they can
exercise constitutional rights. 160 Most commentators-including those not particularly fond of
strong protections for professional speech-agree that such compelled speech is impermissible.1 61
Although the analysis for laws involving truthful but medically unnecessary and onesided speech is more nuanced, these laws are just as invalid. Requiring women to listen to
unnecessary, unwanted descriptions of ultrasounds (as the North Carolina and Texas laws
mandate) implicates their interests against unwanted speech intrusions in a private setting.1 62 It
smacks of intimidation because of the particularly exposed, vulnerable position of women during
medical exams, when they receive this superfluous information. 163 Such coercion is especially
troubling because it occurs while a woman is trying to exercise her constitutional rights, and a
physician is providing her advice on how to do so.1
The physician's autonomy interests are implicated as well; by being forced to participate
in a medically unnecessary procedure designed to intimidate women into adopting the state's
ideological position, the doctor's personal liberty interests and professional responsibilities to the
155

See Part I.B., supra.

156

Id

157

See Part I.C., supra.

158

See Part I.B., supra.

159

See Part I.C., D., supra.

160

Id

161

See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 82, at 52 ("a state law compelling physician speech would have to be

reasonably related to the regulation of the medical profession, and would have to compel factual, uncontroversial, and nonideological speech").
162
See Part I.C., supra.
163

We have protections against a lawyer repeatedly asking a witness the same question or forcing him or
her to repeat the same facts over and over again at trial for the same reason.
164
See Part I.C., supra.
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patient to give appropriate care and advice based on purely scientific considerations are
compromised.1 6 5 Further, by conscripting doctors for its ideological agenda, the state undermines
the medical community's raison d'etre-the development and transmission of medical
knowledge-by interfering with this goal; mars the community's reputation as independent,
objective scientists; and thus ultimately diminishes the medical community's social value. 166
IV. TREATMENT BY COURTS

Historically, courts had held far more respect for protections for physician professional
speech; 1 67 however, since Casey,168 protections for such speech in the abortion context have
eroded steadily. Further, this weakened standard of protection may be expanding beyond abortion.
This trend is particularly disturbing, since states often seek to constrain professional speech to
obstruct the exercise of other constitutional rights. A few recent decisions, however, suggest that
courts may be reconsidering their permissive stance towards state interference with physician
professional speech.
A. Recent Cases RestrictingProfessionalSpeech Protections

Many recent cases continue to narrow or ignore existing protections for physician
professional speech. Consider, for example, the PlannedParenthoodof Minnesota, North Dakota,

165

See Part I.B., supra; Haupt, supranote 1, at 1299-1300 (discussing mandatory ultrasound requirements

in light of the individual physician's place within the larger medical community, she states, "Under the knowledge
community-focused theory of professional speech, the professional is to decide what is relevant professional information.
The knowledge community's insights not only determine what accurate information is, but also what is relevant in any
given situation according to the specific circumstances of the client").
166
See Part I.B., supra.
167

In City ofAkron v. Akron CenterforReprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American

College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court held unconstitutional laws requiring doctors to
make statements to patients to influence their decisions about abortion. The statutes invalidated in these cases very closely
resembled many currently in force today involving false statements, ideological statements, and the one-sided provision of
information. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Berg, supranote 22, at 211-13.

168

505 U.S. 833 (1992). An earlier decision, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), paved the way for

Casey. In Rust, physicians challenged a provision of Title X that forbids physicians from "provid[ing] counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family
planning." 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(1) (1989). Further, under Title X, physicians may not refer patients to an abortion provider
even upon their specific request; the recommended response to such inquiries is "'the [public health] project [funded by
Title X] does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for

abortion."' Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765; 42 CFR § 59.8(b)(5).
Despite the fact that physicians challenging the law raised First Amendment free speech grounds in their
pleadings, the majority opinion did not independently assess First Amendment concerns from the vantage point of either
the physician or patient. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Rust (No. 89-1391; Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771-72. Rather, the Court
analyzed these issues solely through the lens of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and on that basis concluded that this
prohibition "[wa]s not the case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee
or its employees from engaging in activities outside of its scope." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772-73; for a more in-depth
discussion, see Berg, supra note 22, at 209-11. Thus, the Rust majority endorsed government censorship of the speech of
publicly funded physicians, including speakers, in order to promote its ideological viewpoint. Berg, supra note 22, at 210.
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South Dakota v. Rounds1 69 decision upholding South Dakota's informed consent legislation. This
law both requires doctors to give patients inaccurate information (that abortion leads to suicidal
ideation and other mental health issues)o and convey the state's ideological message ("the
abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being," and various
assertions about the nature of the patient's relationship with "that unborn human being")."' The
Eighth Circuit upheld the law, ruling that the statement "the abortion will terminate the life of a
whole, separate, unique, living human being" was factual and not ideological because the state's
definition of "human being" included the "unborn" at any stage of development.17 2 This
definition, however, does not turn an ideological statement into a factual one; whether or not a
fetus is a human being is one of the most important ideological disputes between the pro-choice
and anti-abortion movements. The Eighth Circuit also permitted South Dakota to continue
requiring doctors to give patients false information about mental health connections to abortion,
suggesting that advising patients of an "increased risk" of suicide after having an abortion does
not imply a causal connection." But, this textual justification is unconvincing; the statement is
still misleading, and most people would interpret the link causally.
Following Rounds, the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas's ultrasound requirements 1 74 in Texas
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey.1 15 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the First
Amendment concerns within Casey's unconstitutional conditions framework and held that "such
laws are part of the state's reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the
rubric of compelling 'ideological' speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny." 1 7 6 The
Court also stated that 'relevant' informed consent may entail not only the physical and
psychological risks to the expectant mother facing this 'difficult moral decision,' but also the
state's legitimate interests in 'protecting the potential life within her.'"' Essentially, the Court
considers the state's ideological interests relevant information to the patient's decision-making,
separate from the patient's own medical or moral concerns. Thus, the state can compel doctors to
deliver its ideological message to women.
Although the state can seek to persuade women to forego abortion under Casey, the
Court did not recognize that the regulations here were impermissibly coercive." Further,
although the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the district court's concerns about women being
required to listen to a sonogram description against their will, the opinion never addresses this
particular issue.179
169

530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).

170

See Part I.B., supra.

171

See Part I.B., supra.

172

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-36.
Planned Parenthood Min., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 898-99 (2012) (stating that "Planned

173

Parenthood argues that these studies do not examine the correlation between abortion and suicide in sufficient detail to
prove a causal link .. . but, as we concluded above, the suicide advisory does not require disclosure of a causal link").
174
See Part I.D., supra.

175

667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).

176

Id. at 576.

177

Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 871).

178

Id. at 577-80.

179

The Eighth Circuit concludes that requiring women to declare that they are victims of rape or incest to
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B. Recent Decisions EvincingRespect for ProfessionalSpeech Protections

In a welcome deviation, the Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Loomisso struck down North
Carolina's similar mandatory ultrasound law as unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit held that
"this compelled speech [related to the ultrasound] . . . is ideological in intent and in kind"' and
therefore violated the First Amendment. After acknowledging that the law was a regulation of the
medical profession,1 8 2 the Court stated that this provision "extend[ed] well beyond" the normal
measures used to ensure informed consent,' "impose[d] a virtually unprecedented burden on the
right of professional speech that operates to the detriment of both speaker and listener,"1 84 and
"simultaneously threaten[ed] harm to the patient's psychological health, interfer[ed] with the
85
physician's professional judgment, and compromise[ed] the doctor-patient relationship."
Some laws restricting physician speech on other topics-for example, discussions of
medical uses for marijuana 86 and gun ownership' 8 -have been held unconstitutional as well.
Ideally, these examples represent the start of a new trend of courts giving greater consideration to
First Amendment concerns in physician professional speech cases; in light of the longstanding
trend restricting protections for such speech, however, it is too soon to be more than cautiously
optimistic.
V. CONCLUSION

Protecting professional speech from governmental ideological interference secures the
First Amendment rights of patients and doctors to decisional, professional, intellectual, and
physical autonomy and integrity. Despite the important interests at stake, through the
misapplication of Casey, courts have condoned states' infringement of these rights and have been
complicit in states' attempts to turn physicians into ideological mouthpieces. Consequently,

avoid listening to the sonogram is not problematic because if the State could properly decline to grant any exceptions to
the informed-consent requirement, it cannot create an inappropriate burden on free speech rights where it simply
conditions an exception on a woman's admission that she falls within it. Indeed, such an infirmity could just as well be
cured by striking down the exceptions alone as by striking down the requirement of written certification. Because the
general requirement is valid, we see no constitutional objection to the certification required for an exception. But, there is
no discussion about the issues associated with this "general requirement" or why such a provision does not implicate the
patient's First Amendment interests. Id. at 578.

180

992 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff'dsub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir.
2014),
cert. denied sub nom. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
181
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242.
182
Id
183
Id
184

Id at 252.

185

Id at 250.
See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629 (9th Cir. 2002) (invalidating a federal policy forbidding physicians from recommending or prescribing medical
186

marijuana to patients).
187
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (Feb. 16, 2017) (finding Florida's law forbidding
physicians from discussing firearm ownership with patients to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
physicians' speech).
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states' trespasses on doctor-patient discourse have become increasingly flagrant and oppressive,
and continue to expand within and beyond the abortion context. A few recent cases provide hope
that courts may be rethinking their permissive approach to state impositions on physicians'
professional speech, but considering the long trend towards greater restriction, the fight to regain
proper protection for such speech will likely be an uphill battle.
Although professional speech has been especially important in the abortion regulation
context, the same interests govern other areas of medicine and other professions. Already, states
have sought to take advantage of this lower standard and courts' permissive approach to the
persuasion-coercion distinction to constrain physician-patient discussion of marijuana and
firearms. Indeed, nothing limits this standard to physicians; it could be extrapolated easily to other
professional speech contexts, including the law. Such restrictions on professional speech are
especially disturbing considering the important role professionals and their advice play in the
exercise of constitutional rights. But the First Amendment can and has historically protected
individuals and professionals from becoming mouthpieces of the state. Such protections for
professional speech should be restored.
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